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Abstract
In China, with the economic reforms leading to the raise in agricultural productivity, the rural
healthcare organisation has been weakened. In a 1991-2006 database, a decrease in the healthcare
demand is observed. If many papers study the effect of the insurance system (NCMS) on the healthcare
demand, other factors explaining the healthcare demand have not received much research attention
yet. We use a matching and difference in difference model to correct for the selection bias on insurance
effect. If the income level and insurance enrollment plays a major role on the healthcare demand,
we shed light on the peer effect of the industrialization process and the changes affecting healthcare
facilities. In a context of healthcare price widely increasing, the change in villagers working activity
leads to an increase in the inequality of healthcare access (due to inequality of wage, mobility, and
private insurance). The result is a reduction and sometimes worse, an exclusion from the healthcare
access for the poorest. A public policy has to be conducted to support farmers, in particular in areas
where a significant part of the village inhabitants have an industrial activity.
Keywords: Healthcare demand, Health insurance, Healthcare suppliers, Inequality, Industrializa-
tion process, China.
JEL Classification: D82, H52, I18.
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1 Topic
Financial hardship caused by ill-health is becoming one of the top reasons accounting for impoverishment
in rural China (Liu, 2006). If many sources can be found, a large part of the literature focuses on health
insurance effect. In this paper, we explore three major factors that may explain the variation in the
healthcare demand: i), the insurance system; ii), the change in healthcare facilities access including the
price and the geographical distribution ; iii) the urbanization and the industrialization process. The
results shed light on the peer effect of the industrialization process due to the changing patterns of
healthcare utilization.
The most commonly studied topic in the litterature is the insurance effect on the healthcare demand.
Before the economic reform, the rural healthcare organization was based on the Cooperative Medical
Service (CMS). The CMS can be viewed as an almost full-insured program. This program ensured access
to basic medical services for China’s rural population. The contribution was financed by the collective
welfare fund. With the de-collectivization of agriculture, the welfare funds were sharply reduced and
in some areas, they were dismantled (Zhu et alii, 1989; Liu, 2004). By 1993, less than 7 percent of
the rural population was covered by the CMS. The question of the healthcare access became an acute
issue. Accumulating evidence highlighted that high and rapid increase in expenditures from using health
facilities were causing widespread poverty and deterring families, especially poor ones (Wagstaff et alii,
2009). As a response, China adopted a new health insurance system, the New Cooperative Medical
Scheme (NCMS) in 2003. Beginning with only 310 out of China’s 2,861 rural counties in 2004 (Mao,
2005), its coverage had expanded to 2,451 counties by the end of 2007, accounting for 86 percent of all
rural counties in China (Wen, 2008). A growing litterature assesses the impact of this NCMS policy on
the change in healthcare demand (Wagstaff and Yu (2007), Wagstaff et alii (2009), Lei and Lin (2009).
As well Wagstaff et alii (2009) as Lei and Lin (2009) find some mitigate evidence of an impact of the
NCMS on the healthcare demand. 1In this paper, we assess the NCMS effect control for healthcare
price controlling for the healthcare facilities change and the industrialization process, which was not done
before.
Since the early 80’s, the policies regarding hospital finance has changed. At the beginning of the
economic reforms, state financing constituted about 60% of hospital revenues. By 2003, it had fallen to
8%. To make up for the shortfall, hospitals have come to regard drugs sales as one of their main sources
1Wagstaff et alii (2009) found that the NCMS has had no impact on cost per case. However, it has increased the likelihood
of people seeking outpatient and inpatient care, as well as the volume of care provided. Lei and Lin (2009) found that the
NCMS significantly increases the utilization of preventive care, but we do not find improvement in either formal medical
service use or in health status.
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of revenue. Drugs account for roughly half of total expenditures, representing 43% of expenditures per
inpatient visit and 51% of expenditures per outpatient visit (Eggleston 2008). The result is an increase in
the healthcare price. In rural areas, the health spending increased almost 7-fold between 1990 and 2002,
much faster than per capita income and prices generally (Eggleston, 2008). The fiscal decentralization
reform also contributed to a change in the access to healthcare services. Indeed, according to the wealth
of the area, the county or township governement may not have the financial capacity to maintain the
healthcare system. In the same time, the government encourages the creation of private community
clinics or the transformation of public health facilities into private ones. Therefore, this reform led to
some changes in the healthcare facilities geographical distribution that may affects the healthcare demand.
A concentration of public healthcare facilities in the higher density areas is observed. Akin et alii (2005)
show that while the distance to clinics reduced significantly, travel distances to public hospitals increased
for all strata of communities. Because an increasing number of clinics are private, the access for the
poorest may then be an issue. We here assess the effect of the health facilities organization changes on
the healthcare demand.
The industrialization and urbanization process may also explain the change in the healthcare demand.
The urbanization is (i) the consequence and (ii) the cause of the internal migration: (i), the result of
the internal migration is the increase in the number of people living in the city. The share of the
population living in cities has stretched from 30% to 70% since the economic reforms started. This
process may also contribute to concentrate the public hospitals in the higher density areas; (ii), because
of the infrastructure developpment, the need for workforce in cities rise and leads to an increase in the
internal migration. Moreover, more people living in rural area may have a job in industrial sector with an
higher wage than with an agricultural activity. They may also benefit from the firm of health insurance.
Very few studies documented its extend. Liu et alii (2003) show that urbanization leads to a significant
and equitable increase in insurance coverage. However, the authors finds no association between the level
of urbanization and the probability of using care after controlling for health insurance and the severity
of illness in the access model. We also examine the industrialization effect on the healthcare demand.
From the China Health and nutrition Survey (CHNS) over the 1991-2006 period, we set up the
determinants of the healthcare demand. If many papers study the effect of NCMS on the healthcare
demand, others factors such as the industrialization process or the healthcare facilities change, explaining
the healthcare demand have not received much research attention yet. We show that the changing patterns
of healthcare utilization lead the industrialization process to have some ”side” effects on the healthcare
demand. The change of working activity for village inhabitants and the development of transportation
system are keys to this ”side” effect. Why? With the industrialization process, the percent of rural
inhabitants working in industrial activity rises. This industrialization process that goes along with
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urbanization not only drives people to live permanently in urban areas but also creates a category of
people who work in a place without permanently settling in it. This covers diverse situations, from daily
commuting to floating long-term migration.2 Because of higher wages than in agricultural activity, the
latter are more likely to be able to have access to the private village clinic.3,4 Not only these people may
afford to go to private village clinics but also may have access to healthcare facilities in their working
place, may have an easier access to township hospitals and/or they likely have an health insurance from
their job in industrial sector that cover private healthcare expenses. This raises the critical questions of
healthcare access for the poorest, namely part of the farmers.
In Section 2, we present the Chinese setting on healthcare organization and healthcare insurance.
Data information and some preliminary statistics are given Section 3. In Section 4, we present the
econometric models . In Section 5, we set up the urbanization as a key factor of healthcare access. We
also present results of propensity score matching (PSM) estimations, controlling for a non-randomized
subscription to the NCMS on the results and discuss the robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 The change in healthcare services
The basis of the rural healthcare organisation is the Cooperative Medical System (CMS). This system
was implemented in rural China in the 1950s (Yip et al., 2008). It was organized at the village 5level and
managed by the CMS Management Committee, consisting of village administration representatives and
the community clinic.
The CMS had organized healthcare with three levels, called the three tier structure. In the first tier,
part-time ”barefoot” doctors in health clinics provided preventive and primary care. Barefoot doctors
are villagers who had short training courses. For more serious illnesses, they referred patients to the
second tier: commune health centres, which might have 10 to 30 beds and an outpatient clinic serving a
population of 10,000 to 25,000 and which were staffed by junior doctors. The commune health centres
2In China, the term ”migration” recovers internal migration. People from rural area go to work in urban area. However,
this migration is geared (freiner) by the residence permit, the ”hukou”. A part of this population is then considered as
floating. They live in two areas, the working place and the hometown. There is a lot of debate on the definition of the floating
population and the percent of this population. Only one thing is certain, the part of migrant population is significant and
rapidly increasing but they do still not have the same right on public services as the population with the right permanent
”hukou” of the urban area.
3The public health insurance does not cover private healthcare expenditure.
4In most of the village, there is no more than one clinic.
5In the following, the terms ”village” and ”community” represent the same area.
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referred to the third tier the most seriously ill patients: county hospitals, staffed with senior doctors.
This three-tier system was managed and financed locally. It was established for rural population, through
which the farmers could access primary health care almost for free. The scheme was financed by collective
welfare funds, subsidies from upper level government.
The CMS developped quickly and widely in its early years. In 1978 it covered around 90% of rural
residents (Liu and Cao, 1992). Although a relatively low level of quality, this program helped reduce
China’s mortality rate during the 1960s and 1970s (Sidel, 1993). With the end of the collective economy
in the early 1980s, most villages lost their collective welfare funds, which in turn resulted in the loss
of the main source of financing for the CMS. 6As a result, counties began dropping the program and
coverage rates fell sharply from 90 percent in 1980 to 5 percent in 1985 (Liu and Cao, 1992). Despite
various attempts to rebuild an insurance system, the majority of rural residents remained uninsured
between 1985 and 2003 (Yip and Hsiao, 2008). Then, in 2003, a health insurance system called the New
rural Cooperative Medical System (NCMS) was implemented. Compared with the former CMS that was
based on a universal basis, the NCMS is on a voluntary basis.7 First, the county has to voluntarily adopt
the NCMS insurance system. Then, the household voluntarily subscribes. For the NCMS, the premium
is paid by household and subsidized by government, with financial obligations of all level governments
whereas the old-CMS was managed and funded by both village collectives and farmers, without other
financial obligations. So, the risk pool level is at the county level for the NCMS and not anymore at
the township or community level. The novelty of the NCMS is also some broad guidelines issued by the
central government, provincial and county governments even if they retain considerable discretion over
the details. About the covered services, the NCMS focuses on inpatient services whereas the old-CMS
focused on prevention and health care (Smith, 1993; You et alii (2008)). In China, people really care
about the health prevention. They use traditional medecine as such plants to prevent diseases. The
behaviour for sick people is less predictable. This may also explain the lack of real increase in healthcare
demand although the implementation of the NCMS.
Besides the insurance system change, some changes are also observed for the hospitals themselves.
From a previous situation where the budget of rural health facilities was heavily financed by the govern-
ment, the public contribution represents today less than 8% of the total revenue of hospitals. That is
6At this period, the Cooperative Medical System became a generic name for all health insurance developped by a public
authority (community, county, ...). Therefore, there were as much different types of public health insurance as communities
that said have a CMS health insurance.
7This decision was motivated by widespread dissatisfaction in rural areas with a proliferation of fees and taxes. In order
to reduce the tax and fee burden of rural residents, the government has eliminated a number of rural taxes and reduced
others (Yep, 2004; Lin, 2005). In this context, it was seen as difficult to introduce a new mandatory charge.
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even less in rural health facilities. During the period 1979-1991, the government introduced a co-payment
system. The aim was to change the hospital incentives to push them to increase the level of quality (Du,
2009). These change led a trend toward a professionalization of the medical delivery system. However,
the main source of profit now comes from drugs sales. Over-prescribed drugs and high-tech diagnosis is
often considered as the source of healthcare increase (Eggleston et alii, 2008; Wang, 2005).8 Currently,
the care the system delivers is judged both more costly and more sophisticated than is medically nec-
essary (World Bank, 2004; Blumenthal and Hsiao, 2005; Liu and Mills, 1999). That has likely a direct
impact on the decrease in health care demand.
Since the 80s, reforms of the health sector also pushed to the privatization of community clinics.
New private clinics surfaced in rural communities. A rapid spread of private clinics at the community
level replaced the public ones. Services provided by private clinics are often of better quality but more
expensive than the former public community clinics (Smith, 1998). The reduction of financial support is
also explained by the 1990s’ fiscal decentralization reform. The responsibility to fund the health sector
lies in local governments. The regional disparities in economic development have led to dramatically
reduce health facilities in poorer areas. These areas were unable to charge user fees to raise the funds
needed to compete with the physician compensation packages offered by facilities in wealthier markets
(Akin et alii, 2005).
In other words, a centralization of the public healthcare services is observed. Beside the debate on
the healthcare price for private healthcare facilities versus public ones (see Liu et alii, 2006), the public
health insurance covers the healthcare charge from public facilities. The proximity of the urban area
where are set up the county hospital medical services may have an impact on the healthcare demand.
3 China Health and Nutrition Survey
3.1 The data
We use the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). The CHNS covers nine provinces that vary
substantially in terms of geography, economic development, public resources, and health indicators.
With data sets covering four counties in each surveyed province, this sample includes 36 counties overall.
The first survey round of the CHNS was conducted in 1989. Six additional rounds were conducted in
1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, and 2006. This survey was conducted by the Carolina Population Center
from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the National Institute of Nutrition and Food
8Wang (2005) suggests that the government subsidy for the NCMS does not actually reach to the farmers but to the
health providers.
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Safety from the Chinese Center for Disease (Lei and Lin, 2009). This large-scale longitudinal survey was
conducted using a multistage, random cluster process.
Because the rural and urban population are different in many more ways than just geographic consid-
eration, it is not pertinent to work these two populations in one model. Considering a dummy variable
for rural area is far from enough to capture all the difference between these two populations.9 As urban
and rural health care systems are segmented in China, previous litterature (Liu et alii, 2003) note that it
is more appropriate to treat urban and rural population groups as two differently distributed samples for
empirical studies. In terms of healthcare, one of the major reform is the New Cooperative Medical System
(NCMS).10 This reform targets rural areas. Therefore, we choose here to work on rural areas. To define
the healthcare demand, we work on the population who self declares health trouble. The data covers 128
rural communities in 1991 and 1993, 127 rural communities in year 1997, 145 rural communities each in
other years. In each community, 20 households are surveyed. The database contains 5 529 observations.
3.2 Preliminary evidence
We observe an important decrease in the visit to a doctor. In the same time, more and more people prefer
to use self-medication than to visit a doctor (Table 1). The percent of people who looked for healthcare
is decreasing from 1991 to 2004. Many studies find significant and apparently non-random reductions in
care utilization during the last two decades (Bloom and Gu 1997; Hesketh and Zhu 1997; Gao et alii,
2001). These changes have elicited a great deal of concern, particularly since reductions in utilization
have often been particularly dramatic for less advantaged groups.
The year 2006 is the first year when an increase of healthcare demand is observed. Because the NCMS
is implemented in 2003, the intuition is that this increase is due to the NCMS (Table 1). Therefore, we
consider two samples according to the subscription of an insurance. For uninsured people, we also
observed this increase in healthcare demand for the year 2006. These first preliminary results suggest
that the increase in healthcare demand observed in 2006 is not due or not only due to the insurance
program implementation.
Table 2 displays results on the subjective health. If the share of people in good health status is stable,
the share of people in bad and very bad health increases. In other words, we observe a deterioration of
the health status for people formerly in fair health.
9Of course, we also consider more subtil models but Chow test validates the assumption of two different models.
10See above for details on the NCMS
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As said before, previous to 2003, the Cooperative Medical System was a generic name for all health
insurance developped by a public authority (community, township, county). Therefore, there were as
many different types of public health insurance as communities that still provided such a system. In
the following, we call this insurance program, the old-CMS. On a voluntary basis the county adopts the
NCMS starting from 2003. This program is an insurance that covers all the household (and not only the
individual). However, the level of coverage varies according to the county. In the following, this program
is called NCMS. Table 3 displays the results by wave. First, very few counties and individuals still have
the old-CMS. Second, we observe that the NCMS is rapidly implemented by counties and subscribed by
households.
In order to measure the price of health care, we use the information from the household survey:
how much money does a person pay for treatment of cold or flu in the normally used facility by family
members? The expenditures for treatment of flu in certain facility can be served as a proxy of price for
several reasons. First, this measurement is a comprehensive cost in treatment of flu including service fee
of the doctor, drug expenditures and examination fees. Second, this measurement is based on the service
of almost same quality, i.e. treatment of cold, which makes it comparable between different facilities
and over time. Furthermore, we take average of the reported value spent on treatment of flu in village
clinics in a community to proxy healthcare price in village clinic and take the average amount spent
on flu in county hospital to proxy county-hospital price.11 We do not have an id for township, so we
use the average value spent in a township hospital in a community to get the price level of township
hospital. The following table compares the price change over time in various facilities. The price has
been adjusted to year 2006 using the price index offered by CHNS dataset. Table 3 displays the results.
Prices at both levels are increasing over time. Price in community clinics increased 2-fold and in county
hospitals increased almost 3-fold between 1997 and 2006. The increase is much more important when we
consider the whole period of observation. The price in community clinics is around 4 RMB in 1991 and
goes up to 26 RMB in 2006. Because the price has been adjusted using price index, it is observed that
the healthcare price increased more than the overall inflation level.
The percent of farmers decreases over the years. It was about 67% in 1991 to decrease to 45% in
2006. In the same period, the average wage increases from 3, 000 RMB per year and household to 7, 400
RMB in 2006 (Tables 4 and 5). If the number of farmer decreases over the time and the average income
increases over the time, what about the inequality? We use the Gini index to measure the inequality. It
clearly appears that the inequality increases over the year. It was about 0.37 in 1991 to reach 0.49 in
2006.
11A community or village is included in a township that is itself included in a county that is itself included in a province.
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We also provide some preliminary statistics by area. Overall, we observe a significative variance
between Chinese areas. The healthcare price as well as the percent of insured people or the healthcare
demand vary between areas. The NCMS is adopted by the county of the voluntary basis that may explain
the percent of NCMS varies according the area. These variances are also observed for the proportion
of farmers (Table 4) and the average income (Table 5) or the indexes of inequality (Gini indexes). In
2006, the proportion of farmers is 18% for Jiangsu province whereas 66% for Heilongjiang province. The
percent of farmers is an indicator of the change in working activity. We observe a large trend of the
change in working activity and a wide disparity according to the area.
Table 6 displays results on facilities geographical distribution. If more and more villages have a
clinic, we observe an increase in the number of private facilities and no trend in the number of healthcare
facilities. Therefore, the share of public hospital is decreasing. Meanwhile, the distance to the community
clinic or township clinics has been reduced. Henceforth, the health facilities of proximity have been
developped but these facilities are private facilities. That echoes Akin et alii (2005)’s results. During the
1991-2006 period, there was a policy to incent to the set up of private clinic hospitals. The privatization
of the healthcare facilities is paralleled with the increase of the inequality. The question of access for the
poorest could be an issue.
We observe a general improvement of the urbanization over the year, as Liu et alii (2006). More
accurately, we note a improvement of the road condition. The roads were mainly in dirt and stone in
1991 to become more and more pavel or in mixed material. The infrastructure of communication (the
phone system) is also improved with the developpment of the phone system and a higher proximity of the
postal service for Chinese villagers. In the same time, we also observed an increase in the trade activity.
4 Estimation strategy
In this paper, the healthcare demand is explained at the individual level.
4.1 The estimation
Consider individual i in the county c of the province p at the year t. Let HCicpt be the dependent
variable that a binary variable indicating whether the individual answers ”visit a doctor” to the question
”what do you do when sick?”. We can specify a general function form as following:
P (HCict = 1|Xict, µc, νt) = G(xip, µc, νt; ict) (1)
Where G(.) is a known function taking values in the open unit interval; Xict is the vector of individual
characteristics and socioeconomic conditions for individual i in the county c of the province p at the year
9
t. Anderson and Newman (1973) consider three groups of factors for Xict that determines the healthcare
use. i), the predisposing factors including age, gender, education, marital status and job status; ii),
enabling factors including income and insurance coverage; iii), need factors that refer to one’s health
status and disease conditions. In this paper, we follow this framework. µc and νt are vectors of fixed
effects. νt is the time effect that controls for a time trend for the year 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004
and 2006. µc is a vector of fixed effect controlling for individual geographic location. Indeed, if the
broad guidelines issued by the central government and the provincial one, these latter retain considerable
discretion over the details. Theorically, the concrete implementation of the policy is decided at the
community level. However, some aspects of the implementation depend on the community. For instance,
the rule for the NCMS implementation is on a voluntary basis. Actually, in some communities, the choice
is decided collectively. Then, the NCMS system is subscribed by all or a large part of the community.
Because of the too few number of individual in some communities, the results can be biased. The
estimation of nonlinear panel data models with fixed effects by MLE is known to be biased, when for one
dimension, the number observation is fixed (here, the number of interviewed by community) and for the
other dimension (here the number of community), there is a large number of observation, the number of
fixed effect parameter (here the community fixed parameters) is unbounded with available information
on the fixed effect being fixed, which in general yields inconsistent estimators. Therefore, we also perform
a community specific random effect model controlling then for province specific fixed effect. Note that
for each model, Hausman’s test performed validitates the community specific fixed effect assumption. ict
control for all unobserved residual effects on P (HCict).
The NCMS policy may have two effects. The first one is a direct effect, the household enrollment
in the NCMS insurance. However, the presence of the NCMS program in the community may also have
effect on the community whatever the insurance subscription. This effect is measured at the community
level.
The implementation of the NCMS in counties is not randomized. NCMS pilot counties are not ran-
domly selected. These early pilot counties are likely to have higher levels of income, capacity, and political
will to implement (Lindelow and Wagstaff, 2005). Moreover, households who decided to subscribe are
likely to have some specific characteristics. If the selection biases resulting from unobserved character-
istics are constant over time, then we can remove them by using a differences-in-differences estimation.
Differences-in-differences model compares differences in each individual’s outcome, before and after an
individual began participating in the NCMS. The control group includes individuals who did not partic-
ipate in the NCMS. This group identifies the time path of outcomes that would have happened in the
absence of the treatment. The time effects capture differences over time that are common to all groups.
This method is applied for the NCMS subscription index and for the NCMS community implementation.
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4.2 Urbanisation factors including industrialisation factors
In Liu et alii (2003)’s paper, the urbanization is defined as an index categorized into three levels. This
index is obtained from summation of three major sets of variables: the density approach, the forces
driving the urbanization process (Lucas, 1988) 12; the development of specialized industries and services
generating higher returns than agriculture 13; the development of infrastructure. Therefore, all component
of the urbanization indexes are mixed together.
If industrialization development is part of the urbanization process, the industrialization development
may also have consequences on non-yet-urbanized area. For instance, an increasing percent of village
inhabitants working out of the village, in a industrial firm, could be a push factor to developp trans-
portation but without effect on the availability of communication services or a good water sewers that
are part of urbanization process. Therefore, the industrialization development may have an effect that is
not perfectly correlated with the urbanization process. In the following, we use the term ”side” effect of
industrialization to define this effect.
Considering urbanization indexes used by Liu et alii (2003), we propose to consider separatly the
direct component of the urbanization on one hand ; on the other hand, the component that can be
interpreted as the ”side” effect of the industrialization process.
Uct is the vector of urbanization characteristics 14; Ict is the vector of ”side” effect of industrialization
development. We include the percent of people working in other activities than agricultural activity, the
percent of people working outside the village, the presence of a bus stop index, the presence of a train
station index.
4.3 Selection issue: a propensity score model
Using a DinD estimation, we control the estimation for selection bias on unoberved characteritics constant
over the time.15. However, we may have some bias based on observed characteristics. NCMS pilot counties
were selected by a rather complex set of criteria, including local economic development, delivery of health
care service. Based on the panel data at community level, we use a Propensity Score Model (PSM) to
deal with this problem. Non-participants do not have the same characteristics as participants. Instead
of aiming to ensure that the matched control for each participant has exactly the same value of X,
12This point is defined in Introduction Section as the consequence of the internal migration
13This point is defined in Introduction Section as the cause of the internal migration
14The vector of urbanization characteristics has been defined in the spirit of indexes defined in Liu et alii (2003)
15Here, we assume that we have no bias on selection bias based on unobserved characteristics
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same result can be achieved by matching on the probability of participation. Pairing treatment and
control groups that have similar observable characteristics eliminate potential bias. This assumes that
participation is independent of outcomes given X. We restrict samples to assure common support. Since
the NCMS decision is a household one, variables are all defined at the household level.
We first estimate the propensity score using a logit model that a household chooses to enroll into the
NCMS program as a function of the pre-treatment characteristics. The model is then used to predict
the probability of visiting a doctor. Then we match each observation from the treatment group with an
observation from the control group with replacement based on the nearest propensity scores.16
According to the context, we may consider two control groups. Indeed, we have three categories:
NCMS households, non-enrolled households living in NCMS counties, and households living in non-
NCMS counties. Proposal A, we compute the propensity scores on the all sample considering NCMS
households as treated and others as the control group. The decison of non-enrollment to the NCMS
insurance is here equivalent to the absence of enrollment choice to the NCMS. Proposal B, we compute
the propensity scores considering NCMS households as treated and non-enrolled households living in
NCMS counties as the control group. Then, we use the sample of NCMS counties.17. We present the
results considering each of these two proposals.
5 Results
5.1 Healthcare demand
Table A1 displays the results. The need factors have the expected effect. Indeed, the worse the health,
the higher the healthcare demand. About the predisposing farctors, women have more healthcare access
than men. In rural areas, controlling for the income, the education level does not have any significant
effect on the healthcare demand, whereas the social situation has. The reference is to be married. To
be unmarried affects significantly positively the healthcare demand whereas the fact to be divorced,
separated or widow is negatively correlated with the healthcare demand. One explanation is the seldom
status (divorced, separated or widowers) makes people less carefull about their health. Controlling for
others variables, to be a farmer does not also play on the healthcare demand.
Enabling factors include income and insurance coverage. The income has a positive and significant
effect on the healthcare demand, even controlling for the level of education. To be insured plays a positive
16Results are available upon request.
17For more details on the choice of control group in such a situation and on the PSM methods, see Wagstaff (2009)’s
paper.
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and significant role on the healthcare demand. Even if the old public insurance (old-CMS ) covers a wide
number of insurance system, the philosophy itself of a public health insurance increases the healthcare
access. One of the major factors to explain the variation of the healthcare demand is the presence of a
new insurance market. With a “naive” fixed effect model, we get a significant effect of being insured by
the NCMS insurance system on the healthcare demand (Columns (1) and (2)). Actually, Chinese context
in 1991 is different from Chinese context in 2006. Moreover, characteristics of the NCMS insured may be
different of characteristics of non-NCMS insured. Using a DinD estimation to correct for this bias, the
NCMS still plays significantly on the healthcare demand as found by Wagstaff et alii (2009).
The NCMS policy may have two effects. The first one is the household subscription to the NCMS.
The second effect is the implementation of the NCMS in the village.18 Whatever the model, the presence
of NCMS do not have any significant effect on the healthcare demand.19 However, the presence of NCMS
insurance market may affect negatively the healthcare demand through an increase in the healthcare price.
Feldstein (1970) show that physicians raise their fees when insurance becomes more extensive. Without
controlling for the price, the effect of the presence of NCMS program in the village could then be biased.
Henceforth, we control the model for the price. The presence of the NCMS in the village has no effect on
the uninsured (Columns (3) and (4)). Controlling for the price, the results are unchanged (Columns (5)
and (6)). Therefore the presence of the NCMS insurance market does not affect the healthcare demand.
Controlling for the province, we get a strong effect of the price Column (6). The price variance
within-community is very small for a given healthcare. Therefore, the price effect is not identified for a
community fixed effects model.
5.2 Urbanization, industrialization and facilities access
We now consider a model including urbanization and facilities access factors. The age and the severity
have a positive effect on the healthcare demand. To be a woman also increases the healthcare demand.
The social situation has the same effect on the healthcare demand as those explained before.
If the level of education does not have any effect on the healthcare demand, the income does. The level
of income affects positively and significantly the healthcare demand. Therefore the income or monetary
transfer could be a vector for a policy to encourage the healthcare demand. However for several reasons
18As said, the NCMS village have some specific characteristics compared to the non NCMS village. We use a DinD
estimation to correct for this bias.
19Note that controlling for the community fixed effects, we get a perfect correlation with the index of implementation of
the NCMS in the community.
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this instrument is not the easiest one to use. First, there are difficulties to control the use of the monetary
transfert ; second, the induced demand may distorded its expected effect.
We now turn on the effect of urbanization, industrialization and facilities access on the healthcare
demand (Table A2).
First, we focus on the urbanization variables that cannot be interpreted as ”side” effect of the in-
dustrialization process. Table A2 displays the results including the urbanization indexes. We also run a
regression with a comparable set of variables as Liu et alii (2006). 20The intuition is that the improvement
of the area betters the access to the facilities. Individuals are more aware about the importance of their
health status and the importance to react rapidly when a health trouble appears. Theorically, we may
get a positive effect of the urbanization on the healthcare demand. Actually, the urbanization variables
have no significant effect on the healthcare demand. We do not find any direct effect of urbanization on
the healthcare demand. This result echoes that in Liu (2006)’s paper.
Second, we focus on the ”side” effect of the industrialization process. More acurately, we focus on the
”side” effect of the industrial revolution. The increase of the urbanized area lead to an increase in the
industrial activity and in the need of labour and so, workers. If a part of these workers work and leave
in the urban area, some of them may prefer to work outside the village but live in the village. The land
right and the registration permit (”hukou”) are some factors that incent them to stay in their village.
Consequently, in the rural area, the percent of farmer decreases. To test for this effect, we use indexes as
the percent of village inhabitants working outside the village for more than one month and the percent
of inhabitants with a non agricultural activity. Village inhabitants working outside the village cover a
wide range of people’s category. It could be from daily commuting to floating long-term migration. The
commun point of these people’s categories is the need of good framework of transportation. To make
this movement, the area of origin needs to have at least basic infrastructure for transportation (road, bus
or train station). Therefore, we also control for the indexes of transportation: the presence of the train
station and the bus station.
If the bus station index is not significant, the train station plays negatively on the healthcare demand.
Focusing on the people’s activity: the percent of people working outside the village has a strong and neg-
ative impact on the healthcare demand. Therefore, there is a negative side effect of the industrialization
process on the healthcare demand.
20Because of the important number of missing values, the results are not presented here. The results are available on
request.
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The road condition is strongly significant. The better the road shape, the higher the healthcare
demand. It makes appear the ambigus interpretation of the road shape. On one hand, the road condition
allows to outside-workers to get their working place. On the other hand, the road condition improves the
community environnment and it participates to the urbanization of the community and so it betters the
healthcare access.
We show that the share of private facilities have a negative effect on the healthcare demand. In the
preliminary statistics, we already saw that the share of public hospital is decreasing. In overall, we can
say that there is a reduction of the public facilities access that is a factor of the decrease in the healthcare
demand. This result are relevant with the ”side” negative effect of the industrialization process parallel
to the change in facilities organization (geographically and financially).
But, who are the victims of these change? We then consider crossed variables between the type of oc-
cupation and the percent of villagers working outside (in other words, the percent of internal emigration).
It appears that farmers are the ones who are as much excluded of the healthcare market as the percent
of internal emigration is important (Columns (7) and (8)). More and more inhabitants of the village
have an industrial activity and so, an higher wage than farmers. Some of them, more likely the skilled
workers, may get an insurance from their job. The policy acts as both, a push factor for the rapid spread
of private village clinics; and, a contributor to the huge increase in the healthcare price. Even with the
NCMS program, people may be not reimbursed for visiting a doctor in a facility. The NCMS program
contracts with facilities. The healthcare expenses are reimbursed only for these facilities. Currently, the
cost for healthcare in the private clinics village is more expensive now than with the former public ones.21
The increase in county public hospitals healthcare are not totally compensated by the level of coverage
of NCMS insurance. So, those with non farmer activity are more likely to afford to visit healthcare fa-
cilities. Workers may have an health insurance from their firm that covers part of the private healthcare
expenses. Besides, the farmers have less opportunity than the village inhabitants working in industrial
activity outside the village, to move out of the area where they live and work. As consequences, the
increase in percentage of people with an industrial activity likely increases the inequality of healthcare
access condition through the inequality of wage and the inequality of mobility. The village are more likely
to have a facility but from farmers point of view, less and less healthcare access.
However, we have to moderate the opposition between farmers and non-farmers. Village inhabitants
with non farmer activity is an non homogeneous group. Skilled workers and unskilled workers do not
benefit from the same condition. Outside the hometown, they work and live in their workingplace. Even
21If there are evidences that the private village facilities are more expensive than the former public ones, there is no
evidence that the current price in private facilities is higher than in a public ones (Liu et alii, 2006, Health policy)
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being in the city, unskilled workers are likely excluded of all the services provided by the city (private as
public on the main cases). Therefore, the proximity in distance to a public healthcare hospital is not a
higher proximity of access for them. If they have an higher income, it does not necessarely compensate
the price index gap between the homeplace and the working place.
To test the financial exclusion to the community clinics for part of the less advantaged group, we
control for the community income and an index of inequality as Gini coefficients. Because the farmers
ear less than workers in industrial activity, the decrease in the share of farmers leads to increase the
income inequality, what is observed in the preliminary statistics. Controlling for other determinants
(Columns (9) and (10)), the Gini index and the community average income do not have any impact on
the healthcare demand. It is not the income inequality by itself that affects the healthcare demand but
the change of activity. At the same level of wage, some of village inhabitants in an industrial activity
have more possibility to get healthcare access: They may benefit of an insurance from their job ; they get
more opportunity to move out of the area because the place where they live is not their working place.
Whatever the model considered, the presence of the NCMS insurance in the village does not affect
the healthcare demand after controlling for others determinants.
5.3 Healthcare demand on PSM sample
From now, the result are conditionned by the assumption of a non selection bias on the observed char-
acteristics. However, a large litterature focuses on a selection bias on NCMS insured (Wagstaff et alii
(2007, 2009), Liu et lii (2006)). Using the matching approach of Wagstaff (2009), Table A3 displays
results of Table A2 corrected for this selection bias. To test the robustness of the results, we carry out
the differences-in-differences estimation using a sample where non-NCMS households are matched with
NCMS households using a PSM method.
On the PSM sample, the results confirm the strong impact of the peer effect of the industrialization
process on the healthcare demand. Moreover, corrected for selection bias due to observed characterisitics,
the increase in healthcare price has a significant negative effect on the healthcare demand. The inequality
index, Gini, also plays negatively on the healthcare demand. The more the inequality, the less the
healthcare access. However, the increase in the average income improves the healthcare demand.
6 Conclusion and discussion
After more than twenty years of transition and tremendous economic growth, part of China has caught
up with the most advanced countries. The economic reforms allowed an outstanding growth in the Gross
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Domestic Product (GDP). One consequence is a decreasing proportion of the rural population living
in extreme poverty and an improvement of the level of nutrition. Another consequence is a disruption
in the rural healthcare organization. The healthcare organization was mainly financed with the village
collective welfare funds. With the economics reforms, the village collective welfare funds are then financed
by farmers’ willingness to give. The complete or partial disparition of this fund led to a crumbling of
the healthcare system. The former healthcare insurance system was disintegrated. Rural inhabitants
were completely insured for the prevention care and the out-patient visit before the economic reforms. A
critical point was attained when less than 10% of the rural population was covered by a health insurance.
The Chinese government reacted then by establishing in 2003 a health insurance namely the new rural
community medical system (NCMS).
Many studies report significant reductions in healthcare utilization since the begining of the 80s. The
report is the following one: individuals practise more the auto-medication than before the economic re-
forms. The price of the healthcare increased in a drastic way. Finally, individuals auto-declare themselves
in a poorest health. In this paper, not only do we assess the effect of insurance and the healthcare price
but also the the industrialization process and the healthcare facilities change.
The China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) is a unique and ongoing micro-level eight province
longitudinal survey of Chinese households. CHNS survey is realized from successive waves where the same
households are questioned. This survey also provides information on communities. From a panel data,
over the period 1991 to 2006, we observe a decrease in healthcare demand. We use here a ”difference-
in-difference ” model on a PSM sample to eliminate selection bias. We then shed light on the ”side”
effect of the industrialization process parallel to the healthcare facilities change to explain the decrease
in healthcare demand.
The change from agricultual activity to industrial activity has occured rapidly in China. This increase
in the density of the urbanized area and the developpement of the industrial activity also have conse-
quences in rural areas. More and more village inhabitants do not work as farmers anymore. They work
outside the village in industrial activity. The industrialization process that goes along with urbanization
not only drives people to live permanently in urban areas but also creates a category of people who work
in a place without permanently settling in it. It can be situations from daily commuting to floating
long-term migration. But, why would an individual not live in the area where he works ? It can be
explained by the social network (family, friends, relatives) or the land rights policy. The residency permit
”hukou” is also an incentive to stay in the village. People rights are only established for the place defined
by the ”hukou”. The rights in terms of public services including healthcare access and NCMS insurance
are defined by the place of the permanent residency permit. By definition, migrants do not live in the
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town of their permanent residency permit. The change from a rural ”hukou” to a urban one is almost not
possible.22Therefore, the question of healthcare demand is an issue for migrants (Hua, 2008 and Milcent,
2010). To get their rights associated to the ”hukou”, they work outside their residency permit but have
to live at least part-time in the area of their residency permit in particular in case of health troubles.
Meanwhile, the deep changes in the facilities geographical distribution: i) as said, the centralization
in higher density area of public healthcare facilities ; ii) the development of private clinics where farmers
cannot afford to go. The reforms of the health sector led to facilitate the emergence of private infrastruc-
tures of health and to precipitate the disappearance of public health centers. Farmers are faced to village
clinics that provides healthcare at a cost higher than the former village public ones. Beside, a policy
was implemented to improve the level of high-tech equipment and to reduce the government (central
government as provincial ones) financial support to public hospitals, to disengage the government from
the financial burden. Drugs sales are become the main sources of hospital revenue. As consequence,
public hospitals improved the quality of the offered healthcare but at a healthcare cost much more higher
than before. Some autors advocated an over-performed of procedures to make profit (Eggleston 2008).
Today, if almost all rural inhabitants are covered by the NCMS, the level of coverage that is still far from
enough to compensate the healthcare price increase.
This changing patterns of healthcare utilizations and the change in working activity had two con-
sequences. First, workers in industrial activity may have easier access to facilities outside the village:
because, they are likely insured by their firms; because of a public facility in proximity of their working
place. Second, workers in industrial activity earn more than in agricultural activity. Some of them may
afford to access to private community clinics. Indeed, these private village clinics provide better quality
but are more expensive than the former public community clinics. So, farmers may be excluded of the
community facility for financial reason and they may be excluded of the public facility for geographical
facility distribution reason23. That explains why we get a ”side” effect of the industrialization process.
Thus, farmers who do not really gain benefit from China’s tremendous industrial growth, are heavily
hit by its side effects. These latter (side effects) contribute to increase the healthcare price, to a change
in the framework of the healthcare facility and to an increase in the income inequality. If the income and
the insurance system are keys factors to better the healthcare access of the less-advanded population,
the industrial change plays a crucial and central role. We highlight that the higher the percent of non
farmers in the village and the better the transportation system, the lower the healthcare demand of
22Except in some cases as university graduate individuals
23They also can be excluded of the public hospital for financial reason but the NCMS that covers for public healthcare
expenditure should soften this effect
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farmers and unskilled workers is. Today, our recommendation is the institution of a public policy to
support the farmers and unskilled workers in the area where rural inhabitants have the less agricultural
activity. There are several reasons that makes monetary transfer policy not the easiest policy tool to use.
First, there are difficulties to control the use of the monetary transfert ; second, the induced demand
may distorded its expected effect. Another policy tool could be a financial support the healthcare access
in area where rural inhabitants have the less agricultural activity. It sould be an extended insurance
coverage in these areas.
A naive but important question is why some rural inhabitants choose a agricultural activity? what
are the characteristics of this population? What are the determinants of being a rural farmers? All this
question deserve to focus on to be able to implement the most adequate policy. However, the farmers
are not the only ones to undergo consequences of the changing patterns of healthcare utilizations. The
unskilled workers that work outside the village, are in poorer working condition than the skilled ones, and
sometimes as the farmers ones. this groups of people do not benefit from the NCMS program as easily
as the farmers because they are only part-time in the village. They are also excluded of the workingplace
healthcare program because of their registration permit, the ”hukou”. Therefore, a policy that aims to
better the farmers healthcare access have also to take into account this internal migrant population.
Knowing that children tend to stay in the village even when parents chose to migrate, another crucial
question is what the impact of the industrial process peer effect and so, the decrease in the healthcare
demand on the next generation. At last, having more information on the mobility and on the private
insurance for the rural inhabitant working in industrial activity will allow to desangle the effect of the
three sources of inequality: wage, mobility, and private insurance.
In the urbanized area, with the economic reforms, the ability to make profit attracted people that
led to the developpment of industrial activity and the internal migration. So, the economic developped
is based on the internal unskilled migrants. What will be the next futur if this population is the ones
excluded of the healthcare market?
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7 Appendix
Table 1: By wave, Healthcare demand(%)
All Insured Uninsured Self-care Ignore
1991 76.88 84.38 76.51 . .
1993 76.11 - 76.00 9.24 13.27
1997 75.75 71.19 76.28 15.65 6.29
2000 69.62 79.63 68.65 20.74 8.36
2004 55.64 62.50 54.73 27.84 14.37
2006 61.93 63.22 61.09 23.68 10.70
Total 65.18 65.27 65.17 22.54 11.41
Source: China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), 1991-2006
Table 2: By wave, subjective health
Wave Good health Fair health Bad health Very bad health
1991 13.66 62.73 20.78 2.83
1993 11.23 66.84 18.88 3.05
1997 13.13 62.25 20.89 3.72
2000 14.93 52.33 27.57 5.17
2004 14.61 46.26 32.62 6.51
2006 12.54 47.33 32.98 7.15
Total 13.31 56.74 25.31 4.65
Source: China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), 1991-2006
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Table 3: By wave, insurance and treatment price
Wave Old-CMS NCMS Flu price
Comm. clinic Towns. hosp. County hops.
1991 5.45 - 3.74 4.51 6.39
1993 0.25 - 5.51 7.22 8.89
1997 10.57 - 13.15 16.44 22.91
2000 5.92 - 17.49 22.44 38.68
2004 - 10.25 19.28 28.98 46.45
2006 - 36.25 25.97 35.91 63.35
Total - - 14.17 18.70 29.80
The price has been adjusted to year 2006 using the price index offered by CHNS dataset.
Source: China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), 1991-2006
Table 4: By area and wave: percent of farmers
All years 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006
Liaoning 21 48.04 55.38 48.99 . 51.09 49.55 35.15
Heilongjiang 23 71.31 . . 74.83 78.35 64.82 66.28
Jiangsu 32 41.23 56.30 53.97 41.99 47.57 22.36 17.96
Shandong 37 44.58 47.83 45.33 44.40 52.56 40.81 37.75
Henan 41 68.97 79.60 81.95 65.06 59.82 65.69 63.56
Hubei 42 60.08 70.70 57.34 64.09 59.17 54.33 49.75
Hunan 43 48.46 68.83 49.62 56.28 48.92 31.85 27.29
Guangxi 45 59.85 64.63 59.39 59.99 73.81 52.63 50.49
Guizhou 52 65.83 83.18 69.04 64.66 59.97 58.04 53.96
Total 56.49 66.71 58.70 59.05 58.99 49.60 45.01
Source: China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), 1991-2006
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Table 5: By area and wave, Household Income
All years 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006
Liaoning 21 5,851.20 3,008.97 3,459.59 . 5,880.44 7,638.84 9,166.28
Heilongjiang 23 5,765.09 . . 4,046.97 4,668.96 7,208.96 7,639.02
Jiangsu 32 6,925.39 3,829.85 4,169.54 6,144.20 7,333.21 10,694.60 10,628.57
Shandong 37 5,171.13 2,675.54 3,117.62 4,565.50 5,759.16 6,868.07 8,717.79
Henan 41 3,924.31 2,527.55 2,275.93 3,505.83 3,657.07 4,998.76 6,456.47
Hubei 42 4,112.26 3,215.21 2,693.32 3,660.40 3,999.86 5,116.03 7,115.38
Hunan 43 5,203.22 3,489.28 4,141.16 4,874.97 4,551.08 7,083.28 7,842.50
Guangxi 45 4,323.01 3,061.83 4,158.77 4,138.83 4,807.84 4,748.53 5,080.48
Guizhou 52 3,342.35 2,166.16 2,688.29 2,842.46 3,438.38 4,380.36 5,249.14
Total 4,843.02 2,975.66 3,352.48 4,164.55 4,900.60 6,424.60 7,403.65
Source: China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), 1991-2006
Table 6: By wave, healthcare facilities distribution
Wave Clinic village Nb facilities Distance
Total Private Township County
1991 0.77 3.33 0.09 1.94 11.29
1993 0.77 3.01 0.09 2.00 9.33
1997 0.82 3.32 0.19 1.93 9.95
2000 0.80 3.16 0.46 4.50 10.18
2004 0.86 2.74 0.40 1.60 8.69
2006 0.80 2.34 0.34 1.75 7.60
Total 0.81 2.99 0.27 2.35 9.70
Source: China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), 1991-2006
Computed at the community level
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Table 7: Healthcare Demand
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln(Income) 0.0954*** 0.0658* 0.0945*** 0.0788** 0.0814** 0.0739** 0.0825** 0.0775**
(0.0365) (0.0357) (0.0365) (0.0357) (0.0385) (0.0376) (0.0387) (0.0379)
Severity 2 0.542*** 0.517*** 0.542*** 0.510*** 0.576*** 0.548*** 0.576*** 0.548***
(0.0732) (0.0727) (0.0732) (0.0726) (0.0780) (0.0773) (0.0780) (0.0773)
Severity 3 1.154*** 1.119*** 1.154*** 1.120*** 1.141*** 1.116*** 1.140*** 1.115***
(0.123) (0.122) (0.123) (0.122) (0.129) (0.128) (0.129) (0.128)
SRH 2 0.318** 0.316** 0.321** 0.317** 0.304* 0.302* 0.304* 0.304*
(0.155) (0.154) (0.155) (0.153) (0.164) (0.161) (0.164) (0.161)
SRH 3 0.222 0.222 0.226 0.217 0.205 0.184 0.205 0.185
(0.152) (0.150) (0.152) (0.150) (0.160) (0.158) (0.160) (0.158)
SRH 4 0.125 0.129 0.130 0.118 0.0166 -0.00713 0.0178 -0.00443
(0.162) (0.160) (0.162) (0.160) (0.171) (0.168) (0.171) (0.168)
Age: 18-25 0.0161 0.00535 0.0157 -0.00174 0.0181 0.0155 0.0156 0.00956
(0.206) (0.204) (0.206) (0.204) (0.220) (0.217) (0.220) (0.217)
Age: 25-39 0.121 0.0923 0.120 0.0956 0.164 0.134 0.162 0.129
(0.109) (0.108) (0.109) (0.108) (0.115) (0.114) (0.115) (0.114)
Age: 39-55 0.0967 0.0733 0.0981 0.0767 0.101 0.0866 0.101 0.0869
(0.0874) (0.0866) (0.0874) (0.0863) (0.0936) (0.0921) (0.0936) (0.0921)
Edu: 1-6ys 0.0228 0.0190 0.0211 0.0430 0.0710 0.0963 0.0714 0.0975
(0.0894) (0.0885) (0.0894) (0.0883) (0.0945) (0.0930) (0.0946) (0.0930)
Edu: 6-12ys 0.0372 0.0448 0.0372 0.0620 0.00998 0.0343 0.0116 0.0397
(0.106) (0.104) (0.106) (0.104) (0.112) (0.110) (0.112) (0.110)
Edu: >12ys 0.310 0.141 0.310 0.160 0.280 0.170 0.297 0.219
(0.275) (0.271) (0.275) (0.269) (0.337) (0.335) (0.342) (0.341)
Women 0.191*** 0.179** 0.191*** 0.193*** 0.160** 0.171** 0.158** 0.167**
(0.0719) (0.0712) (0.0719) (0.0711) (0.0763) (0.0752) (0.0765) (0.0754)
Unmarried 0.266* 0.296** 0.264* 0.290** 0.272* 0.282** 0.272* 0.278**
(0.137) (0.136) (0.137) (0.136) (0.144) (0.142) (0.144) (0.142)
Separated -0.972** -1.002** -0.960** -1.044** -1.051** -1.134*** -1.053** -1.140***
(0.422) (0.422) (0.423) (0.421) (0.440) (0.437) (0.440) (0.438)
Widow -0.106 -0.0921 -0.106 -0.103 -0.131 -0.133 -0.134 -0.139
(0.117) (0.116) (0.117) (0.115) (0.124) (0.122) (0.124) (0.122)
Farmer -0.0415 -0.00562 -0.0443 -0.0481 -0.0644 -0.0959 -0.0678 -0.108
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Model A1: Healthcare Demand, continued
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(0.0853) (0.0819) (0.0853) (0.0816) (0.0894) (0.0852) (0.0901) (0.0863)
Old CMS 0.462* 0.434* 0.464* 0.437* 0.467* 0.424* 0.456* 0.399
(0.251) (0.249) (0.251) (0.249) (0.253) (0.250) (0.255) (0.252)
NCMSi 0.274** 0.268** 0.242*† 0.257*† 0.199† 0.228† 0.192† 0.209†
(0.132) (0.129) (0.139) (0.137) (0.145) (0.143) (0.147) (0.144)
NCMSc -0.0177 -0.0193 -0.00689? -0.0545? -0.120? -0.191? -0.118? -0.183?
(0.167) (0.161) (0.167) (0.166) (0.180) (0.177) (0.180) (0.177)
Price (*100) -0.347 -0.636** -0.347 -0.627**
(0.321) (0.269) (0.321) (0.269)
Other Ins. -0.0431 -0.113
(0.140) (0.134)
Community FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE
Province FE FE FE FE
Observations 4900 4945 4900 4945 4398 4447 4398 4447
Standard errors in parentheses ; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Time fixed-effects and area fixed-effects not shown.
The two dummy variables (at the community level and at the household level) capturing possible differences between the
treatment and control groups prior to the policy change, are not presented. † : The interaction term NCMSi, which is the
same as a dummy variable equal to one for those observations in the treatment group in the second period, is the index of
interest for NCMS insured effect. ?: The interaction term NCMSc, which is the same as a dummy variable equal to one
for those observations in the treatment group in the second period, is the index of interest for NCMS county effect.
Table 8: Controlling for urbanization, industrialization and healthcare change
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
ln(Income) 0.08* 0.07 0.09** 0.08** 0.08* 0.07* 0.10** 0.09** 0.08* 0.08*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Farmer -0.12 -0.11 -0.07 -0.06 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Old CMS 0.35 0.33 0.47* 0.41 0.39 0.33 0.37 0.31 0.38 0.33
(0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26)
NCMSi 0.23 0.25* 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.28* 0.23 0.28* 0.22 0.28*
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Model A2: Healthcare Demand controlling for urbanization, industrialization...., continued
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
NCMSc -0.09 -0.12 -0.14 -0.17 -0.16 -0.20 -0.15 -0.19 -0.16 -0.19
(0.21) (0.21) (0.18) (0.18) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Price (*100) 0.15 -0.21 0.09 -0.23 0.24 -0.14 0.22 -0.17 0.24 -0.11
(0.31) (0.30) (0.30) (0.29) (0.34) (0.33) (0.35) (0.33) (0.35) (0.33)
Village clinic 0.01 0.07 -0.06 0.01 -0.06 0.01 -0.06 0.01
(0.15) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15)
hopno -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05* -0.04 -0.05 -0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
% hop.Priv. -0.21 -0.36* -0.27 -0.43** -0.26 -0.41** -0.27 -0.42**
(0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20)
Road shape 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.21*** 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.20***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Teleg 0.12 0.16* 0.08 0.12 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.12
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Telep 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.05
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Post 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
Bus Stop 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02 -0.07
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Train Station -0.20* -0.26** -0.19 -0.27** -0.20 -0.29** -0.18 -0.27**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12)
%Farmer -0.21 -0.15 -0.11 -0.05 -0.14 -0.08 -0.11 -0.06
(0.20) (0.19) (0.21) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20)
%Outsider -0.58*** -0.54*** -0.45** -0.40* -0.42 -0.36 -0.46** -0.42**
(0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.21) (0.26) (0.26) (0.22) (0.21)
%Outsider * Farmer -0.54* -0.49**
(0.32) (0.22)
Gini 0.24 0.33
(0.55) (0.53)
ln(Inc. Vill.) 0.02 -0.07
(0.14) (0.14)
Community FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE
Province FE FE FE FE FE
Observations 4068 4068 4216 4216 3860 3860 3860 3860 3860 3860
Standard errors in parentheses ; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Controlling for Model A1 variables.
ln(Inc. Vill.): logarithm of the average income computed at the village level; Areakm: population size per square kilometer;
Tradea: open trade area or special economic zone near the village; Teleg: Telegraph service; Telep: telephone service;
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Postal: postal service; Road: 1: dirt, 2: stone, pavel or mixed material, 3: paved road; Bus: bus stop; Train: train station.
The two dummy variables (at the community level and at the household level) capturing possible differences between the
treatment and control groups prior to the policy change, are not shown. † : The interaction term NCMSi, which is the
same as a dummy variable equal to one for those observations in the treatment group in the second period, is the index of
interest for NCMS insured effect. ?: The interaction term NCMSc, which is the same as a dummy variable equal to one for
those observations in the treatment group in the second period, is the index of interest for NCMS county effect. We also
control for the different types of ocupation: skilled, unskilled, in service sector, other and crossed variables occupation-% of
outsiders. All the coefficients are not significants. There can be provided on resquest.
Table 9: Healthcare Demand on matched sample
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Income) 0.14*** 0.11* 0.39*** 0.36**
(0.04) (0.22) (0.06) (0.16)
Severity 2 0.33*** 0.36 0.77*** 0.71**
(0.10) (0.27) (0.13) (0.30)
Severity 3 1.43*** 1.44*** 1.13*** 1.03***
(0.17) (0.51) (0.19) (0.33)
SRH 2 0.76*** 0.57 -0.85*** -0.82**
(0.20) (0.39) (0.27) (0.39)
SRH 3 0.59*** 0.33 -0.60** -0.54
(0.19) (0.48) (0.25) (0.41)
SRH 4 0.45** 0.11 -0.95*** -1.03***
(0.21) (0.39) (0.28) (0.38)
Age:18-25 -0.15 -0.33 -0.22 -0.26
(0.30) (0.38) (0.43) (0.82)
Age:25-39 0.68*** 0.64* 0.01 -0.02
(0.15) (0.37) (0.19) (0.26)
Age:39-55 -0.03 -0.14 -0.19 -0.21
(0.12) (0.25) (0.15) (0.31)
Edu: 1-6ys -0.09 -0.04 0.03 0.10
(0.13) (0.17) (0.15) (0.31)
Edu: 6-12ys 0.48*** 0.44 0.31* 0.31
(0.16) (0.27) (0.18) (0.44)
Edu: >12ys 0.07 0.17
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Model A3: Healthcare Demand on matched sample, continued
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
(0.58) (0.73)
Women 0.58*** 0.65*** 0.56*** 0.56***
(0.10) (0.22) (0.12) (0.20)
Unmarried 0.35* 0.23 1.06*** 1.05**
(0.20) (0.39) (0.27) (0.50)
Separated -2.97*** -2.95***
(0.73) (0.94)
Widow -0.40** -0.53** 0.10 0.11
(0.17) (0.26) (0.20) (0.30)
Farmer 2.89 2.83 1.14 1.05
(2.52) (2.12) (0.74) (0.81)
Old CMS 0.91*** 1.08* 1.37*** 1.27***
(0.28) (0.58) (0.36) (0.41)
NCMSi 1.16*** 0.58 0.16 0.12
(0.28) (0.48) (0.22) (0.47)
NCMSc 0.14 0.04 0.38 0.39
(0.18) (0.26) (0.43) (0.70)
Price (*100) -0.75* -1.22* -1.83*** -2.28***
(0.44) (0.70) (0.59) (0.57)
Road shape 0.24*** 0.10 0.19* 0.15
(0.08) (0.14) (0.10) (0.15)
Telegraph 0.35*** 0.44* -0.16 -0.10
(0.13) (0.25) (0.16) (0.20)
Telephone 0.66*** 0.53 0.81*** 0.64
(0.18) (0.41) (0.21) (0.44)
Post 0.60*** 0.51* 0.10 -0.01
(0.17) (0.27) (0.21) (0.53)
Bus Stop 0.24* 0.11 0.02 0.00
(0.14) (0.19) (0.17) (0.25)
Train Station -0.93*** -0.68** -1.14*** -1.06***
(0.15) (0.31) (0.18) (0.38)
%Farmer 1.31*** 0.76* 0.55* 0.46
(0.27) (0.41) (0.31) (0.58)
%Outsider *Farmer -0.39** -0.35 0.58 0.68
(0.18) (0.28) (0.68) (1.23)
GINI -3.48*** -4.10** -0.79 -1.66
(0.74) (1.97) (0.98) (1.21)
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Model A3: Healthcare Demand on matched sample, continued
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Inc. Vill.) 0.46** 0.26 -0.02 0.12
(0.20) (0.30) (0.23) (0.23)
%outsider -1.92*** -1.58*** -1.13** -1.57*
(0.34) (0.38) (0.54) (0.87)
villageclinic 0.62 -0.14 -0.28 0.20
(0.51) (0.40) (0.33) (0.42)
hopno 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.05
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.15)
% hop.Priv. -0.58* -0.11 -0.21 -0.30
(0.30) (0.50) (0.29) (0.37)
Proposal A A B B
Community FE RE FE RE
Province FE FE
Observations 3311 3329 2264 2264
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Controlling for Model A1 variables
The two dummy variables (at the community level and at the household level) capturing possible differences between the
treatment and control groups prior to the policy change, are not shown.
† : The interaction term NCMSi, which is the same as a dummy variable equal to one for those observations in the
treatment group in the second period, is the index of interest for NCMS insured effect.
?: The interaction term NCMSc, which is the same as a dummy variable equal to one for those observations in the
treatment group in the second period, is the index of interest for NCMS county effect.
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